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Abstract. We survey distributed deep learning models for training or
inference without accessing raw data from clients. These methods aim to
protect confidential patterns in data while still allowing servers to train
models. The distributed deep learning methods of federated learning,
split learning and large batch stochastic gradient descent are compared
in addition to private and secure approaches of differential privacy, homo-
morphic encryption, oblivious transfer and garbled circuits in the context
of neural networks. We study their benefits, limitations and trade-offs
with regards to computational resources, data leakage and communication
efficiency and also share our anticipated future trends.
1 Introduction
Emerging technologies in domains such as biomedicine, health and finance benefit
from distributed deep learning methods which can allow multiple entities to train
a deep neural network without requiring data sharing or resource aggregation
at one single place. In particular, we are interested in distributed deep learning
approaches that bridge the gap between distributed data sources (clients) and a
powerful centralized computing resource (server) under the constraint that local
data sources of clients are not allowed to be shared with the server or amongst
other clients.
We survey and compare such distributed deep learning techniques and classify
them across various dimensions of level and type of protection offered, model
performance and resources required such as memory, time, communications
bandwidth and synchronization requirements. We introduce the terminology of
‘no peek’ to refer to distributed deep learning techniques that do not share their
data in raw form. We note that such no peek techniques allow the server to train
models without ’peeking at’, or directly observing, raw data belonging to clients.
Additionally, we survey some generic approaches to protecting data and models.
Some of these approaches have already been used in combination with distributed
deep learning methods that possess varying levels of the no peek property. These
generic approaches include de-identification methods like anonymization [52],
obfuscation methods like differential privacy [100,101,102] and cryptographic
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2 No Peek: A Survey of private distributed deep learning
techniques like homomorphic encryption [19,93,96] and secure multi-party com-
putation (MPC) protocols like oblivious transfer [84,47] and garbled circuits
[41].
In the rest of the paper, we focus on distributed deep learning techniques such
as splitNN [31,2], large batch synchronous stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
[20,9], federated learning[3] and other variants [107,108,109,110] in the context
of protecting data and models.
1.1 No peek rule
We refer to techniques of distributed deep learning that do not look at raw
data once it leaves the client as satisfying the property of ’no peek’. No peek is
necessitated by trust and regulatory issues. For example, hospitals are typically
not allowed to share data with for-profit entities due to trust issues. They also
are unable to share it with external entities (data cannot physically leave the
premises) due to limited consent of the patients, and regulations such as HIPAA
[5,1,6,7,8] that prevent sharing many aspects of the data to external entities.
Some techniques go a step ahead by also not revealing details of the model
architecture as well. In these techniques, neither the server nor client can access
the details of the other’s architecture or weights.
1.2 What needs to be protected
Protection mechanisms in the context of distributed deep learning should protect
various aspects of datasets such as
1. Input features
2. Output labels or responses
3. Model details including the architecture, parameters and loss function
4. Identifiable information such as which party contributed to a specific record
1.3 Computational Goals
It is also quite important that any mechanism that aims to protect these details
also preserves utility of the model above an acceptable level. These goals are to
be ideally achieved at a low cost with regards to
1. Memory
2. Computational time
3. Communications bandwidth
4. Synchronization
As shown in Fig 1. below smaller hospitals or tele-healthcare screening centers
do not acquire an enormous number of diagnostic images and they could also
be limited by diagnostic manpower. A distributed machine learning method for
diagnosis in this setting should ideally not share any raw data (no peek) and at
same time achieve high accuracy while using significantly lower resources. This
helps smaller hospitals to effectively serve those in need while benefiting from
decentralized entities.
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Distributed
Method
Partial/Full Leak-
age
Differential
Privacy
Homomorphic
Encryption
Oblivious Transfer,
Garbled Circuits
Distributed NN
[Dean2012, Wen2017,
Das2016, Ooi2015],
Ben2018]
[Hynes2018,
Abadi2016,
Shokri2015,
Papernot2016]
[Juvekar2018,
Gilad2016]
[Rouhani2017,
Mohassel2017,
Riazi2018,
Orlandi2007]
Large Batch
Synchronous SGD
[Konečný2015,
Chen2016]
Federated Learn-
ing
[McMahan2017,
Nock2018] [Geyer2017]
[Aono2018,
Hardy2017] [Bonawitz2016]
SplitNN [Gupta2018,
Vepakomma2018]
Table 1: This is a survey of distributed deep learning methods with decreasing
levels of leakage from distributed NN to splitNN. Hybrid approaches of these
techniques and differential privacy, homomorphic encryption and MPC are also
included. The citations for these 9 groups have been grouped separately with
subtitles in the references section for convenience.
Fig. 1: Non-cooperating health units
Fig. 2: Distributed learning without
raw data sharing
2 No peek approaches for distributed deep learning
In table 1 we provide corresponding references to various combinations of dis-
tributed deep learning techniques along with generic approaches for protection
that are not specific to deep learning such as differential privacy homomorphic
encryption and secure multi-party computation. The distributed deep learning
techniques such as splitNN, federated learning and large batch synchronous SGD
are ‘no peek’. In addition splitNN also protects model details of the architecture
and weights, unlike the other techniques. We detail this below in table 2 in
terms of the levels of protection offered on data, intermediate representations and
hyperparameters that include the deep learning architecture and learnt weights.
In federated learning and large batch synchronous SGD, the architecture and
parameters are shared between the client and server along with intermediate
representations of the model that include the gradients, activations and weight
updates which are shared during the learning process. Although the data is
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not explicitly shared in raw form in these two techniques, works like [106] have
shown that raw data can be reconstructed up to an approximation by adversaries,
especially given the fact that the architecture and parameters are not completely
protected. SplitNN [31] has an added advantage in this context in that it does not
share the architecture and weights of the model. The protection offered by splitNN
lies in the compact representations found in deeper layers of neural networks
and the difficulty of recovering the underlying data from these representations
without knowing the model weights used to produce them. Such representations
form after passing the data through numerous activations whose inverse in the
case of ReLU are nonlinear and ill-defined (the inverse of a zero-valued ReLU
can map to any negative number). Such representations have been shown to
preserve information important for certain tasks (path following [4]), without
revealing information about the underlying data (such as image features in a
3D coordinate system). The intermediate representation shared by splitNN also
requires minimal bandwidth in comparison to federated learning and large batch
synchronous SGD, as only the activations from one layer of the client called the
cut layer are shared with the server without any associated functions required to
invert them back to raw data. In table 3, we compare these techniques based on
No Peek Deep Learning Data revealed Hyperparametersrevealed
Intermediate
representation
revealed
Large Batch
Synchronous SGD No Yes Yes
Federated Learning No Yes Yes
SplitNN No No Yes
Table 2: In this table, we compare the level of privacy offered over data, model
architecture, model parameters and intermediate representations by techniques
like federated learning, large batch synchronous SGD and splitNN. On all these
aspects, splitNN out performs federated learning or large batch synchronous
SGD.
resources required such as computations, communication bandwidth, memory
and synchronization. We categorize the techniques across these dimensions as
having low, medium and high requirements. As shown, splitNN requires the lowest
resources on the client side. This is because the architecture is cut (arbitrary
shape and not necessarily vertical) at a layer where the computations are only
performed up to that cut on the client side. The rest of the computations happen
on the server side. The experimental results in [31], quantify these comparisons.
3 Federated Learning
Key idea: In this approach the clients download the current model from central
server and improve it by updating their model weights based on their local data.
The client model parameter updates are aggregated to generate server model.
This model is again downloaded by the clients and the process continues. There
is no explicit sharing of raw data in this setup.
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Algorithm 1 Naive Federated Learning. Goal: To learn W ∈ Rd1×d2 from
data stored across a large number of clients. The K clients are indexed by k; B
is the local minibatch size, E is the number of local epochs, and η is the learning
rate.
Ensure:Server executes at round t ≥ 0:
Distribute Wt to a subset St of nt clients
for each client k ∈ St in parallel do
Hkt ← ClientUpdate(k,wt)
Set Ht := 1nt
∑
i∈St H
i
t
Set Wt+1 = Wt + ηtHt
Ensure:ClientUpdate(k,Wt): // Run on client k
B ← (split Pk into batches of size B)
Set Wkt = Wt
for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
for batch b ∈ B do
Wkt ←Wkt − ηO`(Wkt ; b)
return Hkt = Wkt −Wt to server
Algorithm 2 (Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decen-
tralized Data):Federated Averaging. The K clients are indexed by k; B is the
local minibatch size, E is the number of local epochs, and η is the learning rate.
Ensure:Server executes:
initialize w0
for each round t = 1, 2, . . . do
m← max(C ·K, 1)
St ← (random set of m clients)
for each client k ∈ St in parallel do
wkt+1 ← ClientUpdate(k,wt)
wt+1 ←∑Kk=1 nkn wkt+1
Ensure:ClientUpdate(k,w): // Run on client k
B ← (split Pk into batches of size B)
for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
for batch b ∈ B do
w ← w − ηO`(w; b)
return w to server
3.1 Benefits
There is no explicit sharing of raw data. It has been shown in the convex case
with IID data that in the worst-case, the global model produced is no better
than training a model on a single client [9,3].
3.2 Limitations
Performance drops sharply when local data with clients is non i.i.d. That said,
recent work in [112] on federated learning in this setting shows positive results. It
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also requires large network bandwidth, memory and computation requirements
on the client side depending on size of model, computation needs of complete
forward and backward propagation. Advanced compression methods can be used
instead to reduce this overload. There has been active recent work for neural
network compression such as [35,36,111]. These works can thereby reduce the
costs for communication bandwidth when used in distributed learning. Federated
learning has no theoretical guarantees or trade-offs of privacy or security to date.
Client Resources
Required Compute Bandwidth Memory Synchronization
Large Batch
Synchronous SGD High High High
Synchronous updates with backup
workers to compensate slow machines.
Federated Learning Medium Medium High Synchronous client-server updates.
SplitNN Low Low Low Synchronous client-server updates.
Table 3: In this table, we compare the resources required for computation,
bandwidth, memory and synchronization by techniques like federated learning,
large batch synchronous SGD and SplitNN. SplitNN consumes fewer resources
than federated learning and large batch synchronous SGD in these aspects except
for synchronization requirements that are similar across all three techniques.
3.3 Future Trends
Data poisoning attacks on federated learning [37] where malicious users can inject
false training data to negatively effect the classification performance of the model
have been proposed. Adversarial robustness to such attacks need to be improved.
Using neural-network compression schemes in conjunction with federated learning
to reduce the communication overload is an avenue for future work. Looking at
combinations of federated learning and differential privacy, secure multi-party
computation is an interesting direction for future work given that there has been
active research in the recent time in all these areas.
4 Large Batch Synchronous SGD
4.1 Key Idea
The technique introduces additional backup workers to work on updating the
weights, and chooses to synchronously update the aggregated model, as soon
as any of the fastest N workers finish their updates. This is an improvement
in accuracy over asynchronous SGD where some of the local workers might be
updating the weights of a more stale model as the client-server updates are
asynchronous. It also is relatively faster than synchronous SGD with no back-up
workers where the servers wait for all the clients to finish their updates before
aggregating the model parameters to update the model.
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4.2 Benefits
It allows for faster synchronous SGD, and is more accurate than asynchronous
SGD approaches where some clients end up updating the weights based on a
more stale model.
4.3 Limitations
The computational requirements and communication bandwidth required is much
higher than other distributed deep learning methods.
4.4 Future Trends
The future trends are similar to that of federated learning as this method is very
similar in essence to federated learning although it instead runs on a single batch
of data. This method has high computational overload and network footprint.
To make this method more sustainable in data center or decentralized settings,
future work in improving its efficiency is important.
Algorithm 3 Large-Batch SGD
Ensure:Worker Update(k), where k = 1, . . . , N + b
Input: Dataset X , B mini-batch size.
for t = 0, 1, . . . do
Wait to read θ(t) = (θ(t)[0], . . . , θ(t)[M ]) from parameter servers.
G
(t)
k := 0
for i = 1, . . . , B do
Sample datapoint x˜k,i from X .
G
(t)
k ← G(t)k + 1B∇F (x˜k,i; θ(t)).
Send (G(t)k , t) to parameter servers.
Ensure:Parameter Server Update(j), where k = 1, . . . , N + b
Input γ0, γ1, . . . learning rates, α decay rate, N number of mini-batches to aggregate,
θ(0) model initialization.
for t = 0, 1, . . . do
G = {}
while |G| < N do
Wait for (G, t′) from any worker.
if t′ == t then
G ← G ∪ {G}.
else
Drop gradient G.
θ(t+1)[j]← θ(t)[j]− γt
N
∑
G∈G G[j].
θ¯(t)[j] = αθ¯(t−1)[j] + (1− α)θ(t)[j].
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5 Split Learning (SplitNN)
5.1 Key Idea
In this method each client trains the network upto a certain layer known as the
cut layer and sends the weights to server. The server then trains the network for
rest of the layers. This completes the forward propagation. Server then generates
the gradients for the final layer and back-propagates the error until the cut layer.
The gradient is then passed over to the client. The rest of the back-propagation
is completed by client. This is continued till the network is trained. The shape of
the cut could be arbitrary and not necessarily, vertical. In this framework as well
there is no explicit sharing of raw data.
5.2 Benefits
Client-side communication costs are significantly reduced as the data to be
transmitted is restricted to first few layers of the splitNN prior to the split. The
client-side computation costs of learning the weights of the network are also
significantly reduced for the same reason. In terms of model performance, the
accuracies of Split NN remained much higher than federated learning and large
batch synchronous SGD with a drastically smaller client side computational
burden when training on a larger number of clients.
5.3 Limitations
It requires a relatively larger overall communication bandwidth when training
over a smaller number of clients although it ends up being much lower than
other methods in settings with large number of clients. Advanced neural network
compression methods such as [35,36,111] can be used to reduce the communica-
tion load. The communication bandwidth can also be traded for computation
on client by allowing for more layers at client to represent further compressed
representations.
5.4 Future Trends
Given its no peek properties, no model detail sharing and high resource efficiency
of this recently proposed method, it is well placed to provide direct applications to
important domains like distributed healthcare, distributed clinical trials, inter and
intra organizational collaboration and finance. Using neural-network compression
schemes in conjunction with splitNN to reduce communication overload is a
promising avenue for future work. Looking at combinations of federated learning
and differential privacy, secure multi-party computation is an interesting direction
for future work as well given that there has been active research in recent time
in all these areas.
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Algorithm 4 SplitNN. The K clients are indexed by k; B is the local minibatch
size, and η is the learning rate.
Ensure:Server executes at round t ≥ 0:
for each client k ∈ St in parallel do
Akt ← ClientUpdate(k, t)
Compute Wt ←Wt − ηO`(Wt;At)
Send O`(At;Wt) to client k for ClientBackprop(k, t)
Ensure:ClientUpdate(k, t): // Run on client k
Akt = φ
for each local epoch i from 1 to E do
for batch b ∈ B do
Concatenate f(b,Hkt ) to Akt
return Akt to server
Ensure:ClientBackprop(k, t,O`(At;Wt)): // Run on client k
for batch b ∈ B do
Hkt = H
k
t − ηO`(At;Wt; b)
6 Methods to Further Reduce Leakage and Improve
Efficiency
6.1 Obfuscation with Differential Privacy for NN
Key Idea: The methods in [14] modify stochastic gradient descent (SGD) based
optimization used in learning neural networks by clipping the gradient for each
lot of data and adding Gaussian noise to it during the optimization as opposed to
adding noise to final parameters of the model, which could be overly conservative
thereby affecting the utility of the trained model.The sigma for the noise is chosen
at each step so as to maintain a guaranteed epsilon-delta differential privacy for
a given lot of data. The tradeoff between the conflicting objectives of accuracy
and privacy is determined by the lot size.
Benefits and Limitations: The privacy is always dependent on a limited
privacy budget while this also has an inversely proportional dependency with
model accuracy. This is unlike in SplitNN where high accuracies are achieved
without sharing raw data. The guarantees of differential privacy are currently
theoretically backed unlike in SplitNN or Federated Learning. It also violates the
no-peak rule when the privacy budget is over.
Future Trends: There is a lot of scope in combining differential privacy with
distributed deep learning methods like splitNN, federated learning and large
batch SGD as it adds to stronger theoretical guarantees on preventing data
leakage.
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6.2 Homomorphic Encryption for NN
Key Idea Homomorphic encryption aims to preserve the structure of ciphers
such that addition and multiplicative operations can be performed after the
encryption. All operations in a neural network except for activation functions
are sum and product operations which can be encoded using Homomorphic
encryption. Activation functions are approximated with either higher degree
polynomials, Taylor series, standard or modified Chebyshev polynomials that are
then implemented as part of Homomorphic encryption schemes. The works in
[17,19] apply these ideas in the context of deep learning. A greatly detailed survey
comparing various software libraries for homomorphic encryption is provided in
[115].
Algorithm 5 Differentially private SGD
Require: Examples {x1, ..., xN}, loss function L(θ) = 1N
∑
i L(θ, xi). Parameters:
learning rate ηt, noise scale σ, group size L, gradient norm bound C.
Initialize θ0 randomly
for t ∈ [T ] do
Take a random sample Lt with sampling probability L/N
Compute gradient
For each i ∈ Lt, compute gt(xi)← ∇θtL(θt, xi)
Clip gradient
g¯t(xi)← gt(xi)/max
(
1, ‖gt(xi)‖2
C
)
Add noise
g˜t ← 1L
(∑
i g¯t(xi) +N (0, σ2C2I)
)
Descent
θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜t
Output θT and compute the overall privacy cost (ε, δ) using a privacy accounting
method.
Algorithm There are a variety of schemes which have been shown to have
homomorphic properties, and are provably secure. The most common use the
security of the LWE (learning with errors) problem, which seeks to solve a linear
system after adding noise. This problem is difficult to solve in certain conditions
(when the dimension of the vector space is much larger than the computational
range), and has even been shown to be secure under known quantum attacks. In
short, LWE contains an algebraic structure with homomorphisms for addition
and multiplication under the finite field of integers (so all multiplication/addition
of finite integers can be encrypted and evaluated homomorphically as a LWE
problem). In practice, implementations use R-LWE (Ring-LWE, use polynomial
rings instead of vector spaces explicitly), which uses a slightly different represen-
tation, but the underlying algebraic structure remains largely the same.
Simple LWE example: The key generation, encryption/decryption and corre-
sponding add/multiply operations for a simple LWE example are given below.
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Keygen:
A ∈ Zm×nq
S ∼ Znq
e ∼ Nn
b = As+ e (1)
Encrypt/Encode:
r1, e1 ∼ N
c = (ca, cb) =
(
AT r1, b
T r1 +m1 + e1
)
(2)
Add/Multiply:
cadd = c1 + c2 (3)
cmult = D (c1 ⊗ c2) (4)
where ⊗ is the tensor product and D is a dimension switching matrix that sim-
plifies the resulting ciphertext. A proof of correctness and further sophistication
addressing this scheme as a practical system can be found in the LWE literature.
Benefits and Limitations These techniques need specialized hardware or
extensive computational resources to scale. They are capable of providing a higher
level of security that allows for perfect decryption and are not dependent on
trade-offs of obfuscation vs. accuracy. The tradeoffs involved in this case are more
with regards to computational efficiency. For example, some work (Microsoft’s
SEAL) shows that to perform logistic regression on 1MB of data, 10GB of
memory are required, and massive parallelization is necessary to achieve real-time
throughput on practical problems (some tasks may not be parallelizable as such).
LWE hardness is believed to be valid even in a post-quantum cryptographic
environment.
Future Trends This method requires very high computational resources, to
make it scalable to practical deep learning architectures. Current techniques have
only been benchmarked on simple networks over small datasets such as MNIST
hand-written digit recognition. Development of faster methods for large scale
deep learning and specialized hardware is an important avenue for future work.
6.3 Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Garbled Circuits
Key Idea: These techniques are based on the idea of secret sharing and zero
knowledge proof that we describe. The protection is achieved by sharing a
12 No Peek: A Survey of private distributed deep learning
secret message with different entities and requiring that these entities cooperate
together in order to gain accessibility. There are certain problems where two
entities collaborate to compute a function without sharing information about the
inputs to the function with each other. The classic example is the millionaire’s
problem, where f(x1, x2) is computed by two parties, when one party has x1
and the other has x2, and it’s impossible for the party to the learn the value
the other party holds. f(x1, x2) will return a positive number if x1 > x2 and a
negative value if x2 > x1. In this way, two millionaire’s can determine who has
more money without sharing the total value at each hold. This has practical
applications to untrusted “credit checks” or as an example for a particular kind of
“Zero Knowledge Proof.” Yao’s [48] garbled circuit protocol for the millionaire’s
problem and 1–2 oblivious transfer [114,113] are prominent works in this direction.
Computational implementations and frameworks for this work such as Obliv-C,
ObliVM, SPDZ and Sharemind are prominent.
Benefits and Limitations: These techniques have been studied for problems
like secure stable matching, linear system solving and parallel graph algorithms.
There is not much work done at intersection of MPC with deep learning.
Future Trends: Specialized hardwares for MPC are being developed to realize
practical applications of these protocols. As current day machine learning relies
heavily on large scale deep-learning architectures on large datasets, bridging this
gap between MPC frameworks and distributed deep learning is an important
avenue for future work.
Method 100 Clients 500 Clients
Large Batch SGD 29.4 TFlops 5.89 TFlops
Federated Learning 29.4 TFlops 5.89 TFlops
SplitNN 0.1548 TFlops 0.03 TFlops
Table 4: Computation resources consumed per client when training CIFAR 10
over VGG (in teraflops) are drastically lower for SplitNN than Large Batch SGD
and Federated Learning.
7 Comparison of resource efficiency across no peek
distributed deep learning
We now share a comparison from [31] of validation accuracy and required client
computational resources in Figure 1 for the three techniques of federated learning,
large batch synchronous SGD and splitNN as they are tailored for distributed
deep learning. As seen in this figure, the comparisons were done on datasets of
CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100 using VGG and Resnet-50 architectures for 100 and
500 client based setups respectively. In this distributed learning experiment we
clearly see that SplitNN outperforms the techniques of federated learning and
large batch synchronous SGD in terms of higher accuracies with drastically lower
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Method 100 Clients 500 Clients
Large Batch SGD 13 GB 14 GB
Federated Learning 3 GB 2.4 GB
SplitNN 6 GB 1.2 GB
Table 5: Computation bandwidth required per client when training CIFAR 100
over ResNet (in gigabytes) is lower for splitNN than large batch SGD and
federated learning with a large number of clients. For setups with a smaller
number of clients, federated learning requires a lower bandwidth than splitNN.
Large batch SGD methods popular in data centers use a heavy bandwidth in
both settings.
computational requirements on the side of clients. In tables 4 and 5 we share more
comparisons from [31] on computing resources in TFlops and communication
bandwidth in GB required by these techniques. SplitNN again has a drastic
improvement of computational resource efficiency on the client side. In the case
with a relatively smaller number of clients the communication bandwidth required
by federated learning is less than splitNN.
(a) Accuracy vs client-side flops on 100
clients with VGG on CIFAR 10
(b) Accuracy vs client-side flops on 500
clients with Resnet-50 on CIFAR 100
Fig. 3: We show dramatic reduction in computational burden (in tflops) while
maintaining higher accuracies when training over large number of clients with
splitNN. Blue line denotes distributed deep learning using splitNN, red line
indicate federated averaging and green line indicates large batch SGD.
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8 Conclusion and Future Work
No peek deep neural networks require new thinking when compared to existing
data protection methods that attempt to aggregate siloed data for the benefit
of server models. We describe the emergence of three methods in this setting:
splitNN, federated learning and large batch SGD. Novel combinations of these
methods with differential privacy, homomorphic encryption and secure MPC
could further exploit theoretical guarantees. We show that in settings with large
number of clients, splitNN needs the least communications bandwidth while
federated learning does better with relatively smaller number of clients. In this
direction, improving resource and communication efficiencies of no peek methods
would be another avenue for impactful future work. Using advanced neural
network compression methods [35,111,36] will help further reduce the required
network footprint. It is also important to study adversarial robustness to data
poisoning attacks [37] where malicious users can inject false training data to
negatively effect the classification performance of the model. Adversarial attack
schemes from this parallel research area need to be taken into consideration
while developing no peek mechanisms. Efficient no peek methods have direct
applications to important domains like distributed healthcare, distributed clinical
trials, inter and intra organizational collaboration and finance. We therefore
contemplate novel no peek distributed deep learning applications in the future.
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